established by specific orders of the Germans. One cannot point to a single community in which Jewish internal initiative led to the establishment of a Jewish Police.
It is true that, from the outset, the Judenrat were confronted by the problem of the degree to which they could carry out their programs relying only on volunteers, persuasion, good-will, and the Jewish population's sense of public responsibility. During those dark days of Nazi rule, there were in fact individuals who willingly responded to the calls of the Judenrat to implement German demands. However, reality was not such that everyone was ready, or perhaps able, to respond to economic decrees or the call-ups for forced labour. In many of the communities, the Judenrat were accused of unfairly distributing the burden.
The conflict between willing acceptance of authority, and manifestations of reserve or even opposition, is not unknown in the history of the Jewish people.
During various historical periods, even when the representative bodies of the kehillot drew their authority from internal Jewish sources, there were struggles between the leadership and the members of the community. The use of force was thus not a novelty. Because of the difficult circumstances under which responsible for supplying fixed numbers of workers for forced labour, and they employed groups of attendants to bring in those who refused, or those who tried to evade the orders.
In all of these, and other similar activities, compulsion and the use of force were necessary. Yet, the German order to establish a police force provoked many questions within the community and among the members of the Judenrat. It can be unequivocally determined that the Judenrat did not accept the establishment of a Jewish Police as a desirable means for legitimising activities involving the use of force.
What was the source of the unusual sensitivity towards the Police? Did the establishment of the Police mark a fundamental change from the situation mentioned above in which the Judenrat themselves deployed force? It would appear that the members of the Judenrat were of the opinion that as long as they themselves applied the pressure, founded in their own considerations, their actions retained the character of internal measures, even when implementing German demands. However, when the Germans gave orders to establish the Police, fears were aroused that this might mean, among other considerations, the introduction of an element which would abet in the imposition of a foreign authority upon the community.
The Jewish Police came into being some time after the creation of the Judenrat, and it is possible that during these months, the sensitivities of the Jews at large had become sufficiently sharpened so that when the matter of the Jewish Police came to the fore, they began to ponder the real aim of the The Judenrat were aware that the Jewish Police might become a power focus, and that some highly sensitive tasks might be assigned to them, although no one imagined what would be demanded of them during the mass destruction.
Thus, in Piotrkow Trybunalski, for example, when it became clear that there was no escaping the creation of a police force, a discussion was held at a session of the Council in which the city's Chief Rabbi participated. All those present emphasized the danger to the ghetto population should power and authority be vested in a group of youths lacking proper social and moral formation. In fact, the Judenrat in this community selected a special public committee which chose the candidates for the police from among the Jewish youth after examination of their social and moral background.
1 Similar procedures were introduced in other communities as well, although for the most part the Judenrat were unable to ensure the entry of trustworthy elements into the ranks of the Jewish Police. In our comprehensive study of the Jewish Police, the question is raised as to a possible correlation between the size of the community and the patterns of behaviour of the Jewish Police.
We have come to the conclusion that the size of the community does not play a role in determining the pattern of behaviour of the Jewish Police 2 At first, the Jewish Police force was officially determined to be one of the departments of the Judenrat, and the members of the Councils actually attempted to exercise 17 / 5 their authority over it, to render it the executive arm of their policies, and to determine its functions and set the norms for its behaviour, as can be seen by the following examples. In Zolkiew, a member of the Judenrat, Dr. Philip Czaczkes, was also commander of the Police. This appointment was made to ensure contact between the Jewish Council and the Police, and the supervision by the Jewish Council over the Police. The Police did in fact accept the authority of the Judenrat, and was a party to its policies. The Judenrat in this city undertook multifaceted activities to ease the oppression of the community. Seven of these "Regulations" notes that "heading the Ordnungsdienst is a commander who is subject to the direct authority of a supervisory committee of the Judenrat."
13 However, reality was such that the commander of the Jewish Police in Warsaw was soon able to free himself of this supervision, which wished to transform the Jewish Police into a body which would operate for the general welfare of the community.
The moment seems propitious for raising the question as to the degree to which German supervision over the Jewish Police placed in jeopardy the Judenrat control of that organ, even during the initial stages of its existence.
One may note that at the beginning, the Germans were willing to recognize the authority of the Judenrat, albeit a very restricted and controlled authority.
Moreover, the Germans infiltrated their own agents into the command and ranks of the Police. 
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supervision was completely nullified, the Police having developed separatist tendencies, and in a number of communities the situation developed in such a way that the Jewish Police actually rather gained control over the Judenrat.
The Germans encouraged such developments, and exploited these situations in order to undermine Judenrat which opposed or rejected their policies, or which were not sufficiently subservient.
There are a number of examples of this type of situation:
Otwock -The first two Judenrat developed programs for the general communal welfare, while the alienation of the Police was clearly discernible. In the Aktion 
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However, in addition to the investigation of the involvement and influence of the Germans and the Judenrat in the composition of the Jewish police and its functions during the preliminary stages, it is also necessary to assess the attitudes of the Jewish communal structures, operating independently of the Judenrat, towards the Police. In many communities, these forces stood in opposition to the Judenrat, but there were also cases, primarily prior to the mass deportations, in which even these groups recognized the fact that certain of the Judenrat undertakings were indispensable to the Jewish public.
It is true that these communal bodies maintained only selective contact with the Judenrat, and these contacts did not prevent them from voicing criticism when the Judenrat acquiesced to German demands.
In contrast to this highly ambivalent attitude towards the Judenrat, those people who organized themselves into frameworks outside of the Judenrat considered the Jewish police, from its very inception, to be a foreign body implanted upon the Jewish community, composed of elements subservient to the Germans, and antagonistic to the community. In communities such as The primary conclusion to be drawn from these facts is that a decisive percentage of the commanders of the Police was not involved in Jewish public and national life, and some were in fact totally removed from Jewish life. This situation augmented tensions between the Police and the first Judenrat, among whose members a large number of local leaders could be found.
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These antagonisms surfaced in a large number of communities, particularly during the period of mass deportations to the death camps. However, the exclusion of the Jewish population from the general organization of communal services and its isolation, gave rise to many problems which could well be solved by the institution of a Jewish Police of a civil internal nature. In fact, in addition to implementing German demands, the Police dealt with other matters such as: cleanliness, arbitration of differences between individuals, welfare, and criminal cases. An instructive example of these variegated tasks can be found in Czestochowa. We glean a picture of the work of the police from the notations made in its registry which show lost and found, thefts, quarrels, and even incidents in which the assistance of the Police was sought for defence against assaults by Poles. A goodly portion of these activities was undertaken upon the initiative of the Judenrat.
The Functions of the
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These two tendencies -the attempt to mitigate the plight of the community, all the while serving the Germans and satisfying their demands, co-existed within the framework of the Police. Those Judenrat which were sensitive to the image of the Police within the Jewish community also fought against corruption within its ranks, and its exploitation for personal reasons. 
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confronted by two particularly difficult challenges: the snatching of individuals for forced labour (1940) (1941) , and the inception of the mass deportations to the death camps. This period of mass murder also placed the Judenrat in a position from which they could no longer "manoeuvre" between German directives and fulfilling community needs.
During the initial period of the Judenrat's existence, when German demands were limited primarily to the economic sphere, or even to the supply of individuals for forced labour, the members of the Judenrat believed that by acceding to German demands, they could forestall harm to their communities and increase their indispensability to the Nazis, and thus hoped to bolster the communities' ability to survive, knowing that the primary concern was to gain time.
However, when the waves of mass deportations began, and fears as to the fate of the deportees increased -even if the terrible truth was not known in all cases and in all places -under such conditions, continued accession to German demands, when these involved the surrender of Jews, was tantamount to wilfully abetting in harmful measures against the community.
This was the focal point around which behaviour patterns of the different Judenrat revolved -there were those who absolutely refused to surrender Jews to the enemy, while others adopted the approach that by sacrificing a part of the community, others might be saved. There were also Judenrat members whose actions were devoid of any concern for the communal welfare, and who were motivated purely by the desire to secure their own interests.
Indeed, what was involved was not essentially a choice based on real options, but rather moral determinations -determinations which were to directly influence the relations between the Judenrat and the Jewish Police in every community. These decisions, such as the road to be followed, the stance towards the community, and the relationship with the Judenrat, were influenced by the personal considerations of the Policemen as well as by German intervention.
Below, we shall cite several examples to concretise the reality behind these general classifications:
In Cracow, the ties between the Judenrat and the Police were severed at a very early stage, and the latter, together with a special Jewish unit, the In Bilgoraj, the first Judenrat devotedly protected the interests of the community, and for this, Judenrat Chairman Hillel Janower paid with his life.
Hirsch Zilberg was appointed to take his place, and he "never gave advance
warning as to what was to take place, in contrast to his predecessor, who 
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always transmitted the information to the members of the community so that they might be able to go into hiding." 27 The Jewish Police too, surrendered to German pressure, and participated in the round-ups for deportation 28 In Lwow, the Judenrat Chairman Yosef Parnas refused to hand over individuals for work camps and for this reason he was killed. During the last moments of his life, he is reported to have said: "As long as I serve as
Chairman of the Judenrat, no Jewish policeman and no Council official will lend a hand in surrendering people to the Germans." 29 After his death, the Jewish Police began to snatch people to be sent to the work camps.
In Losice, the Jewish Policemen used to warn the community members of imminent Aktionen, and urge them to hide and escape while there was still time.
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In Parysow, the close ties between the Judenrat, the Police, and the Jewish population were particularly noticeable. One of the commanders of the Police was also active within the ranks of the local partisans.
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In Pilica, the Judenrat and the Police worked together and established contact with the underground.
32
In Markuszow, the decisive test occurred on May 7, 1942, when news of an impending deportation was received. The Judenrat secretly informed the entire population that whoever could do so was to run and hide. These warnings were transmitted by the Jewish Police. It should be noted that, in contrast, the Jewish Policemen from Lublin appeared on the scene and began to round-up Jews for deportation. 33 We have seen a panorama of examples which serves to concretise and characterize the various typical situations prevalent in the relationship between the Judenrat and the Jewish Police. In an attempt to assess the behaviour patterns of these two frameworks, we will now return to a broader 17 / 16 perspective. One central conclusion emerges from the data which has been amassed to date: out of a total of one hundred communities in the General Government, the Jewish Police in eighty-six of them acceded to the demands of the Germans at some stage of their activities, including participation in the round-ups for mass Aktionen. The distinction in the various stages in the existence and operation of the Jewish Police is important because the vast number of episodes in which the Jewish Police ceded to German demands occurred most noticeably in the final stages of the ghettos' existence, at a time when personnel changes had been effectuated within the ranks of the Police.
Elements sensitive to public needs had either left the Police or had fallen victim to the Germans. The subservient policemen and commanders prevailed to the very end, although in most cases even they found their death at Nazi hands.
This data relates, as we have already noted, to the situation in the area of the General Government, but similar situations also prevailed in other areas of Nazi-occupied Europe. Although it is possible that in certain areas, such as Western Byelorussia, which became one of the most crucial centers of resistance, both in the ghettos and in the forests, or in Kovno (Kaunas), the cases in which Jewish Policemen had ties with the underground were more numerous, basically the picture was similar to that of the General Government. In any case, the data amassed concerning the Jewish Police in the General Government can well serve as a basis for a broader comparative study of the subject.
The statistical summaries relating to the Jewish Police, which underscore the woeful functions which it performed, also give us a picture as to the standing of the Judenrat, the attitude of the Germans towards the Jewish Police, and their preference for the latter as a framework which would be more subservient to them. This attitude was also a function of a situation in which many Judenrat did not live up to the expectations of the Germans who wished to employ them as a tool for the execution of their policies. In those same one hundred communities, close to seventy Judenrat, entirely or in part, did not cede to German pressure, and did not lend a hand in doing harm to their communities -even if they paid with their lives. These responses include
